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THE WISCONSIN CONSUMER ACT:
WHEN IS A TRANSACTION A CONSUMER
CREDIT TRANSACTION?
RALPH C. ANZIVINO

*

The Wisconsin Consumer Act applies to all consumer credit transactions.
A consumer credit transaction is a defined term under the Wisconsin
Consumer Act. It has six essential elements that have been carefully
interpreted by Wisconsin courts. First, the transaction must be a
consumer transaction that can be a cash or credit transaction. Second, the
transaction must involve a consumer that is contracting for property,
services, or credit for personal, family, or household purposes. Third, the
transaction must be between a customer and a merchant. The Wisconsin
Consumer Act definition of a merchant is significantly different than the
UCC definition of a merchant. Fourth, the subject matter of the
transaction must be real or personal property, services, or money. The
definitions and interpretations of personal property and services subject to
the Wisconsin Consumer Act are so broad as to be nearly limitless. Fifth,
the transaction must involve a grant of credit by the merchant to the
customer. Significant litigation has evolved over the meaning of that
phrase. Sixth, the contract between the merchant and the customer must
either permit the customer to pay in installments or permit the merchant to
charge a finance charge. There are a number of factors that courts
consider in determining whether the parties’ contract permits the customer
to pay in installments. Although “finance charge” is a defined term, the
courts have struggled when distinguishing a finance charge from an
additional charge or a late payment fee.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For over forty years, the Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA or “the
1
Act”) has regulated transactions between consumers and merchants.
2
The WCA consists of seven chapters in the Wisconsin Statutes. At its
heart, the Act has two primary purposes—(1) to require merchants to
3
supply certain disclosures to consumers and (2) to regulate merchant
4
debt collection conduct. A merchant’s failure to comply with the many
disclosure requirements, or violate any of the numerous collection
limitations, will result in a violation of the Act and a coincidental
5
judgment against the merchant. A violation of the Act can lead to
severe consequences, which include paying the debtor’s attorneys’ fees;
forgiving the balance due on the debt; reimbursing the debtor for all
monies paid to the merchant; and permitting the debtor to keep the
6
contracted-for item free of charge. Whether a transaction is subject to
the WCA is a critical determination for both the debtor’s attorney and
the merchant’s attorney. As one might suspect, the consumer’s attorney
is claiming the Act does apply, while the merchant’s attorney asserts the
7
Act does not apply. Normally, neither attorney is involved in the initial
transaction between the consumer and merchant, but the issue comes to
a boil when collection activity is initiated.
There are two prerequisites that must be satisfied before a
transaction is subject to the WCA. The first is whether the transaction is
the type of transaction between the consumer and merchant that causes
8
it to be subject to the Act, and the second is a territorial requirement.
9
The territorial requirement will be addressed in a subsequent article.
Territorial issues aside, any transaction that qualifies as a consumer
10
credit transaction is subject to all of the chapters of the WCA. There
1. 1971 Wis. Act 239; see also WIS. STAT. § 421.102(2) (2009–2010) (providing the
underlying purposes and policies under the WCA).
2. See WIS. STAT. §§ 421–427.
3. See id. § 422.301–.310.
4. See id. § 427.104.
5. See, e.g., id. §§ 422.201(13), 423.302, 424.203(5).
6. See id. § 425.302–.305, .308.
7. See generally discussion infra Part II.
8. WIS. STAT. § 421.201.
9. Ralph C. Anzivino, The Wisconsin Consumer Act: Territorial Considerations?, 96
MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2013).
10. See WIS. STAT. §§ 421.201(1), 422.102, 423.201(1)(b), 424.102, 425.102, 426.102(2),
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are six elements to a consumer credit transaction, and all must be
11
satisfied to be subject to the Act. This article will analyze each of the
six elements of a consumer credit transaction.
II. CONSUMER CREDIT TRANSACTION
If a transaction is classified as a consumer credit transaction,
12
essentially all of the chapters of the WCA will apply to the transaction.
A consumer credit transaction is a
[A] consumer transaction between a [B] merchant and a [C]
customer in which [D] real or personal property, services or
money is acquired [E] on credit and the customer’s obligation is
[F] payable in installments or for which credit a finance charge is
or may be imposed, whether such transaction is pursuant to an
open–end credit plan or is a transaction involving other than
13
open-end credit.
A consumer credit transaction “includes consumer credit sales,
consumer loans, consumer leases and transactions pursuant to open-end
14
credit plans.” There are numerous factors that must be established to
qualify a transaction as a consumer credit transaction, and each factor
15
will be analyzed separately.
The first requirement is that the
16
transaction must be a consumer transaction.
A. Consumer Transaction
The first element of a consumer credit transaction is that the
17
transaction must be a consumer transaction. A consumer transaction is
“a transaction in which one or more of the parties is a customer for

427.102. Section 423.201(1)(b) of the Wisconsin Statutes applies if credit is extended. Id.
§ 423.201(1)(b). Because the first element of a consumer credit transaction requires a
consumer transaction, id. § 421.301(10), any Chapter that applies to a “consumer transaction”
must also apply to a consumer credit transaction.
11. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10).
12. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
13. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10) (emphasis added).
14. Id. (emphasis added). Consumer credit sales, consumer loans, consumer leases, and
transactions pursuant to open-end credit plans will be analyzed in a subsequent article.
15. See discussion infra Parts II.A–F.
16. See WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10).
17. See id.
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18

purposes of that transaction.”
No credit is required, so a cash
19
transaction can be a consumer transaction. For example, where an
individual purchased an automobile from an auto dealer, the court
found a consumer transaction, regardless of whether the purchase was
20
made by cash or credit.
There are two critical components in establishing a consumer
21
transaction: First, one must be a customer; and second, there must be a
22
transaction. A transaction is simply “an agreement between [two] or
more persons, whether or not . . . enforceable . . . and includes the
23
making of and the performance pursuant to that agreement.”
Generally, the parties’ dispute is not about whether there was an
24
Most
agreement, but rather about the terms of the agreement.
25
litigation, however, stems from the issue of whether one is a customer.
B. Customer
Whether one qualifies as a customer under the WCA is an element
in determining whether the transaction is a consumer transaction and
26
also a consumer credit transaction. In other words, one must be a
27
customer in both types of transactions. A customer is an individual,
not an organization, “who seeks or acquires real or personal property,
28
services, money or credit for personal, family or household purposes.”
The WCA also includes an agricultural purpose in the definition of
18. Id. § 421.301(13).
19. See id. § 421.301(13), .301(17).
20. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Wis. 2d 305, 311–12, 313 n.2,
592 N.W.2d 201, 204 n.2 (1999) (finding that the transaction at issue was a consumer
transaction; however, neither party was arguing that the transaction in the case was not a
consumer transaction).
21. See WIS. STAT. § 421.301(13).
22. See id.
23. Id. § 421.301(44).
24. See discussion infra Parts II.B–F.
25. See discussion infra Part II.B.
26. See WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10), .301(13).
27. See id.
28. Id. § 421.301(17); see, e.g., Hartman v. Meridian Fin. Servs., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d
1031, 1048–49 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (finding that there was sufficient evidence that the timeshare
interest purchases at issue were “consumer transactions” and that the plaintiffs were
“customers” under the WCA); Seidling v. Roedl, No. 2009AP107, 2009 WL 4912570, at *1
(Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2009) (citing WIS. STAT. § 422.301(17)) (“The Roedls qualify as
‘customers’ because they contracted to acquire real property for personal purposes.”).
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customer, but that is expressly limited to coverage under the debt
29
collection chapter (Chapter 427 of the Wisconsin Statutes). Despite
the statute’s clear limitation on coverage for agricultural purposes, some
courts have used the agricultural purpose to construe one as a consumer
30
for more than just the debt collection chapter.
The customer carries the burden of proof to establish that the
31
transaction was for personal, family, or household purposes.
An
32
Real
affidavit can be used to establish the customer’s purpose.
property, personal property, services, money, or credit is considered
used for personal, family, or household purposes if it is used 50% or
33
more for that purpose. If an individual plaintiff is unable to satisfy the
34
50% rule, the plaintiff will not be a customer under the WCA. For
example, where an individual incurs credit to operate his business, that
35
individual is not a customer under the WCA. Similarly, where a buyer
29. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(17); see also State v. Ralph Hamel Forest Prods., Inc., 110 Wis.
2d 352, 354–55, 328 N.W.2d 884, 886 (Ct. App. 1982) (finding that “agriculture includes
forestry”).
30. See Grand River Coop. v. Terbeest, 145 Wis. 2d 173, 175, 178, 426 N.W.2d 68, 69–70
(Ct. App. 1988) (finding that a contract between the appellant and an agricultural cooperative
caused the appellant to be a “customer” for purposes of Section 422.305(1) of the Wisconsin
Statutes); see also Ixonia State Bank v. Ingersoll (In re Ingersoll), 8 B.R. 912, 916 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 1981) (finding that Ingersoll’s agreement with respect to a farm caused Ingersoll to
be a customer for purposes of Chapter 425 of the Wisconsin Statutes). But see Ehle v. Detlor,
No. 98-0806, 1998 Wisc. App. LEXIS 985, at *11–12 (Aug. 27, 1998) (buyer’s wholesale
purchase of trees did not fall within “personal, family, household or agricultural purposes”).
31. See Heath v. Avco Fin. Servs. of Wis., Inc., No. 97-3836, 1998 WL 710606, at *4 (Wis.
Ct. App. Oct. 13, 1998) (noting that the consumer who claims the WCA violation carries the
burden of proof of the violation); Ehle, 1998 Wisc. App. LEXIS 985, at *11–12 (denying
venue change where a consumer claimed a particular venue due to the “consumer
transaction”).
32. See Hartman, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1048–49 (finding that affidavits submitted averring
that purchasing interest in timeshare condominiums was for personal, family, or household—
not business—use constituted sufficient evidence to determine plaintiffs’ purpose).
33. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DFI-WCA § 1.06 (2007).
34. See id.
35. See Waukesha State Bank v. Bell, No. 84-1393, 1985 Wisc. App. LEXIS 3318, at *5
(May 15, 1985) (holding that where the defendant acquired credit from the bank for business
purposes—despite the fact that his home was used as collateral—there was no consumer
credit transaction); see also N. Cent. Forklift, Inc. v. Brownson, No. 99-2331-FT, 2000 WL
665729, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. May 23, 2000) (noting that in an installment purchase agreement
between the manufacturer and a construction company for a skidsteer, the WCA may apply
where commercial parties agree to treat the transaction as being under the WCA); Horst
Distrib., Inc. v. Timm, No. 78-081, 1979 WL 30580, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. July 27, 1979)
(holding, in a dispute between a snowmobile distributor and its dealer, that the dealer was not
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made a bulk purchase of trees for planting on his property but did not
establish the purpose of his purchase, the buyer was not considered a
36
37
customer. On the other hand, in Zehetner v. Chrysler Financial Co.,
the plaintiff cosigned various documents to assist her fiancé in
purchasing an automobile, but she never signed the retail installment
38
contract. Chrysler argued that because the plaintiff never signed the
contract of sale she did not qualify as a customer and thus had no
39
40
standing to sue under the WCA. The court disagreed. The court
reasoned that one could be a customer if one simply seeks credit or
41
personal property. The court held that in light of the plaintiff and her
fiancé’s relationship, “their connection through their child, their
apparent intention to marry and the need for support of the child,” the
plaintiff was “arguably seeking both personal property and credit for
42
‘personal, family or household purposes.’” As such, the plaintiff was a
43
customer under the WCA.
In making the determination whether a transaction satisfies the 50%
rule, courts examine the total circumstances surrounding the contracted44
for property or services. Most often, the final determination involves
45
weighing a number of conflicting factors. Merchants should be wary of
concluding the transaction is not subject to the WCA simply because the
contract provides that the transaction is for a business purpose. For
46
instance, in Seeger v. AFNI, Inc., the plaintiff entered into a contract
47
for cell phone service. Thereafter, the plaintiff sued AFNI—who had
48
purchased the account from Cingular —and claimed that AFNI
a customer under the Act except if he had agreed to be governed under the WCA).
36. See Ehle, 1998 Wisc. App. LEXIS 985, at *11–12.
37. Zehetner v. Chrysler Fin. Co., 2004 WI App 80, 272 Wis. 2d 628, 679 N.W.2d 919.
38. Id. ¶¶ 2–5 (discussing documents that the plaintiff signed).
39. Id. ¶ 10.
40. See id. ¶ 21 (holding that plaintiff was a “customer” under the WCA).
41. Id. ¶ 15.
42. Id. ¶ 16.
43. See id. ¶ 15.
44. See, e.g., Seeger v. AFNI, Inc., No. 05-C-714, 2007 WL 1598618, at *7–8 (E.D.
Wis. June 1, 2007); Duston v. Badger Lease, No. 93-1402, 1994 WL 51638, at *2 (Wis. Ct.
App. Feb. 22, 1994).
45. See Seeger, 2007 WL 1598618, at *7–8; Duston, 1994 WL 51638, at *2.
46. Seeger, 2007 WL 1598618.
47. Id. at *1.
48. Id. at *2.
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49

committed various WCA violations. AFNI defended on the ground
50
that the plaintiff was not a customer under the WCA.
During
deposition, the plaintiff admitted that he entered into the cell phone
contract primarily for business purposes and that he used the phone
51
primarily for business. Despite the plaintiff’s admissions, however, the
52
court held that the plaintiff qualified as a customer under the WCA.
The court reasoned that because the contract was in the plaintiff’s
53
individual name, the payments on the account were made with the
plaintiff’s personal credit card, and the plaintiff’s wife used the phone
for personal reasons—on balance—the cell phone service was found to
54
be for personal, family, and household purposes. Similarly, in Duston
55
v. Badger Lease, an individual leased an automobile under a lease
56
captioned “Equipment Lease.” The lease specifically provided that the
57
automobile was to be used solely in the lessee’s business. As a result,
the lessor asserted that the lessee did not qualify as a customer under
58
the WCA. The evidence indicated that at the time of execution of the
lease, the lessee told the lessor that the she intended to use the car to
visit her sister up north and to commute to her job but not to use the car
59
in her employment. The evidence further showed that the address on
the lease was the lessee’s home address, and the lease was not labeled as
60
a commercial lease. On balance, the court concluded the lease was for
personal, family, or household purposes despite the statement in the
61
lease that it was for business purposes.

49. Id. at *5.
50. Id. at *8.
51. Id. at *7.
52. Id. at *8.
53. Id. For another example of a court considering the fact that the contract was in the
individual’s name see Hartman v. Meridian Fin. Servs., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1049 (W.D.
Wis. 2002) (considering fact that customers entered into contracts for timeshare interest in
condominiums in their own, individual names).
54. See Seeger, 2007 WL 1598618, at *8.
55. Duston v. Badger Lease, No. 93-1402, 1994 WL 51638 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 1994).
56. Id. at *2.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (holding that the trial court’s finding that the lease at issue was a consumer lease
was not clearly erroneous).
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Where there are multiple transactions between the same parties,
some transactions may be deemed for a business purpose and others for
62
a personal purpose. The courts, however, have divergent approaches
on how to distinguish a business purpose from a personal one when
there is more than one transaction between the parties. In Ixonia State
63
Bank v. Ingersoll (In re Ingersoll), an individual sod farmer entered
64
into a series of loans with a bank. Upon default by the farmer, the
65
characterization of the loans under the WCA became an issue. The
court held that the loans could be separately categorized depending
upon whether each loan was primarily for a business purpose or a
66
personal one.
67
On the other hand, in Parent v. Citibank (S.D.) N.A., the Parents
were the sole owners of a limited liability company (LLC) that was in
68
the business of constructing log cabins. An entrepreneur contracted
69
with the Parents’ LLC for the construction of a log cabin. The purpose
of the contract was speculation in that after the LLC constructed the log
70
cabin, the entrepreneur intended to sell it for a profit. The log cabin
material was purchased at Home Depot and placed on the
71
entrepreneur’s credit card. Thereafter, a dispute arose between the
entrepreneur and the LLC, and the entrepreneur decided not to go
72
As a result, the entrepreneur directed
forward with the contract.
Home Depot to transfer the account balance for the log cabin material
from the entrepreneur’s credit card to the Parents’ personal credit
62. Ixonia State Bank v. Ingersoll (In re Ingersoll), 8 B.R. 912, 916 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1981).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 914.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 916 (“The Ixonia and Co-op loans were for agricultural purposes, so as to them
Ingersoll was a ‘customer’ and the loans are ‘consumer credit transactions’ within the
meaning of the Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA). . . . As to loans Ingersoll procured for
business purposes, he would not be a ‘customer’ under the WCA’s definition and the loans
therefore could not be ‘consumer credit transactions.’”).
67. Parent v. Citibank (S.D.) N.A., No. 09 C 951, 2010 WL 2425943 (E.D. Wis. June 11,
2010), aff’d sub nom. Parent v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 11-3665 (7th Cir. Sept. 24,
2012).
68. Id. at *1.
69. Id.
70. Id. at *3.
71. Id. at *1.
72. Id.
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card. Home Depot complied and directed Citibank to transfer the
balance from the entrepreneur’s credit card to the Parents personal
74
credit card. Subsequently, litigation ensued between the Parents and
75
Citibank regarding their credit card balance. As part of the litigation,
76
the Parents asserted that Citibank violated the WCA. The central
issue in the case was “whether the transaction at issue was a consumer
77
transaction . . . or a business transaction.” The court held that the
78
dispute between Citibank and the Parents was subject to the WCA.
The initial transaction, the log cabin purchase, was a business
transaction; however, this transaction was between only the
entrepreneur and Home Depot—neither Parent nor their LLC was a
79
party to the transaction. The second transaction, however, between
80
the Parents and Citibank was held to be a personal transaction. The
court reasoned that the definition of “transaction” includes the concept
81
of “performance pursuant to [an] agreement.” Because the credit card
agreement between the Parents and Citibank was premised on
purchases for personal, family, and household purposes, the payment of
the debt transferred to the card anticipated performance pursuant to
82
that particular agreement. The fact that the specific charge originally
83
had a business purpose was not significant to the court. Therefore, the
court concluded that the Parents were customers for purposes of that
84
transaction.
The Parent decision is difficult to reconcile with the 50% rule, which
provides that real property, personal property, services, money, or credit
is considered used for personal, family, or household purposes if it is
85
used 50% or more for that purpose. In Parent, the entire purpose of

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *3.
See id. at *4.
Id. at *3 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at *4.
See id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
WIS. ADMIN. CODE DFI-WCA § 1.06 (2007).
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purchasing the log cabin material was for business purposes, but when
the balance was transferred to a personal credit card, the court
concluded that the debt was for personal, family, and household
86
purposes. Because the purchase of the log cabin kit was 100% for
business reasons, the Parent decision seems to be in conflict with the
50% rule. Stated simply, the Parent decision stands for the proposition
that when a credit card is established as one for personal, family, or
household purposes, any debt charged (or transferred) to that card will
be considered a consumer debt, notwithstanding the fact that the debt
87
may have originally been for a business purpose.
The better approach is reflected in the Ingersoll case. Ingersoll
indicates that the court should look at the basic purpose for each
transaction, which would suggest that where an individual charges both
personal and business purchases to a credit card, the court needs to
distinguish the business from the personal purchases for purposes of
88
applying the WCA. Thus, litigation revolving around a single credit
card balance could involve WCA violations (for actions taken involving
personal debts on the card), even though the card balance may also
89
contain business debts.
Although no court has suggested it, another approach would be to
use the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) “predominate test,” which
would require the court to determine whether the charges on the credit
card are predominately business or personal ones, and proceed
90
accordingly. The WCA expressly provides that unless superseded by
the WCA, the provisions of the UCC (Chapters 401–411 of the
86. Parent, 2010 WL 2425943, at *4.
87. Id.
88. See Ixonia State Bank v. Ingersoll (In re Ingersoll), 8 B.R. 912, 916 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1981).
89. See id.
90. Van Sistine v. Tollard, 95 Wis. 2d 678, 684, 291 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Ct. App. 1980)
(quoting Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974)).
In determining whether a mixed contract for goods and services is a sale of goods
under the code, “The test for inclusion or exclusion [within the code] is not whether
they are mixed, but, granting that they are mixed, whether their predominant factor,
their thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods
incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artist for painting) or is a transaction of
sale, with labor incidentally involved (e.g., installation of a water heater in a
bathroom.”
Id.
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91

C. Merchant
A consumer credit transaction requires that the transaction involve a
customer and a merchant. Although the concept of merchant is a legal
92
term of art, the WCA substantially expands its meaning. The WCA
defines a merchant as a natural person or organization
who regularly advertises, distributes, offers, supplies or deals in
real or personal property, services, money or credit in a manner
which directly or indirectly results in or is intended . . . to result
in . . . a consumer transaction. The term includes, but is not
limited to a seller, lessor, manufacturer, creditor, arranger of
credit and any assignee of or successor to such person. The term
also includes a person who by his or her occupation holds himself
or herself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to such
practices or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed
by his or her employment as an agent, broker or other
93
intermediary.
Although the WCA provides a substantial definition of merchant, “the
94
legislature has failed to define the outer limits of the term merchant.”
It has been suggested, however, that the courts examine the purpose to
95
be served by the definition in order to determine its meaning. In that
regard, it has been determined that the general legislative intent of the
WCA is to govern the relationship between consumers and retail
96
merchants who operate a business for profit. As a result, the merchant
definition has been held to apply to retail merchants in the businesses of
regularly extending credit and also to private commercial businesses
97
that operate for profit. The definition does not include governmental

91. WIS. STAT. § 421.103(1) (2009–2010). Hereinafter, all provisions of the UCC are
cited according to the applicable section of the Wisconsin Statutes that has enacted the UCC.
92. Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 306 (1992) (noting that a legal term of art is
one that has a widely accepted common-law meaning).
93. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(25).
94. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Mussallem, 94 Wis. 2d 657, 668, 289 N.W.2d
801, 806 (1980).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 667, 289 N.W.2d at 806.
97. Id. at 668, 289 N.W.2d at 806–07.
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operations. For example, the Wisconsin Department of Revenue is not
99
considered to be a merchant.
The merchant definition in the WCA is significantly different than
100
the merchant definition contained in the UCC.
The UCC definition
101
One is a merchant who deals in
anticipates two types of merchants.
102
goods of the kind and is called a goods merchant. The other merchant
is one who is familiar with the practices of the particular business or
103
trade and is called a practices merchant. Both the UCC and the WCA
104
use the same definition for a practices merchant. However, with one
105
minor exception, the merchant definition under the WCA is much
106
broader than the goods merchant under the UCC. For example, the
WCA definition includes sellers of real property, services, and credit
107
that are not covered by the UCC. Also, the WCA definition applies to
transactions in personal property; whereas, the UCC covers only
108
“Personal property” is a much broader term
transactions in goods.
109
than “goods.” Personal property includes not only movable property
110
The difference between the two
(goods) but also intangible things.
111
definitions is rational in light of the purpose of each definition. The
98. Id. at 668, 289 N.W.2d at 807.
99. Ludwig v. Geise (In re Geise), 132 B.R. 908, 913 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1991).
100. Compare WIS. STAT. § 421.301(25) (WCA definition of merchant), with id.
§ 402.104(3) (UCC definition of merchant).
101. Id. § 402.104(3). Some consider a merchant who meets both types of “merchant” to
be an independent third type of merchant. See U.C.C. § 2-104 cmt. 2 (2010).
102. See U.C.C. § 2-104 cmt. 2 (2010).
103. See id.
104. Compare WIS. STAT. § 402.104(3), with id. § 421.301(25).
105. See infra text accompanying notes 114–18.
106. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Mussallem, 94 Wis. 2d 657, 667, 289 N.W.2d
801, 806 (1980) (“The legislature has given the term merchant a broader meaning than usually
attributed to the term . . . .”).
107. Compare WIS. STAT. § 421.301(25) (a WCA merchant deals in real or personal
property, services, money or credit), with id. § 402.104 (3) (a UCC merchant deals only in
goods).
108. Compare id. § 402.104(3), and U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2010), with WIS. STAT.
§ 421.301(25).
109. Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1335–36 (9th ed. 2009) (defining property),
with id. at 762 (defining goods).
110. Id. at 1335–36 (defining property).
111. Compare U.C.C § 2-104 cmt. 1 (“This section lays the foundation of this policy by
defining . . . professionals or ‘merchants’ and by stating when a transaction is . . . ‘between
merchants.’”), with WIS. STAT. § 421.102(1) (“Chapters . . . shall be liberally construed and
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UCC definition is a limiting term intended to identify certain
transactions that involve professionals, and thereby, is intended to apply
112
special rules to that particular transaction.
Conversely, the WCA
definition is an expansive term designed “to protect consumers [from]
unfair, deceptive, false, misleading and unconscionable practices by
113
merchants.”
The one minor exception where the WCA definition of a merchant
114
is narrower than the UCC definition relates to educational institutions.
115
The UCC does apply to universities. Whereas, “public and private[]
nonprofit institutions of higher learning are not” considered to be
116
merchants under the WCA, despite the fact that educational services
117
are expressly covered by the WCA. However, courts have concluded
that private profit-making business colleges or trade schools that
118
provide credit or loans to their students are covered by the WCA.
Courts have been consistent in applying the broad WCA merchant
119
definition to private commercial businesses. A bank, for example, is a
120
Also, one who “regularly advertises or deals in real
merchant.
121
property” is a merchant.
For example, the court concluded that an
individual who advertised in a local newspaper every week for four
months that financing was available for the sale of mobile homes is a

applied to promote their underlying purposes and policies.”).
112. U.C.C § 2-104 cmt. 1.
113. WIS. STAT. § 421.102(2)(b).
114. Compare U.C.C. § 2-104 cmt. 3 (“[E]ven persons such as universities . . . can come
within the definition of merchant if they have regular purchasing departments or business
personnel who are familiar with business practices and who are equipped to take any action
required.”), with Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Mussallem, 94 Wis. 2d 657, 669–70,
289 N.W. 2d 801, 807 (1980) (holding that the WCA does not apply to “public and private,
nonprofit institutions of higher learning”).
115. See U.C.C. § 2-104 cmt. 3.
116. Mussallem, 94 Wis. 2d at 669–70, 289 N.W. 2d at 807.
117. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(42)(a)(2).
118. See Patzka v. Viterbo Coll., 917 F. Supp. 654, 657 (W.D. Wis. 1996); Mussallem, 94
Wis. 2d at 669–70, 289 N.W. 2d at 807.
119. See Seidling v. Roedl, No. 2009AP107, 2009 WL 4912570, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec.
22, 2009); Nelson v. Union Nat’l Bank, 111 Wis. 2d 313, 315 n.3, 330 N.W.2d 225, 226 n.3 (Ct.
App. 1983); see also Hartman v. Meridian Fin. Servs., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1049 (W.D.
Wis. 2002).
120. Nelson, 111 Wis. 2d at 315 n.3, 330 N.W.2d at 226 n.3.
121. Seidling, 2009 WL 4912570, at *1; see also Hartman, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1049.
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122

merchant.
An assignee of a merchant is also a merchant under the
123
WCA, even though the assignee may not have a profit motive. On the
other hand, where an individual loaned money to another individual to
enable the borrower to purchase an automobile, no merchant was
124
found.
Also, if one was not originally a merchant, one does not
become a merchant simply by applying interest charges to an overdue
125
account.
D. Real or Personal Property, Services or Money
The subject matter of a consumer credit transaction must be “real or
126
personal property, services or money.” In that subject matter group,
127
personal property and services are the only terms defined in the WCA.
The Act makes clear that personal property “includes but is not limited
128
Although not included in the statutory definition, courts
to goods.”
have concluded that real property includes a fractional interest of real
129
estate-such as a time-share.
Determining what types of services are covered by the WCA is
challenging. The types of services specified by the WCA are very
130
broadly defined, and the exclusions are very narrowly defined. Based

122. Mathews v. Ertz, No. 87-1513, 1988 WL 126440, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 1988).
The court also considered the fact that the individual was nongovernmental and operated for
profit. Id. at *4 n.3.
123. Barrows v. Petrie & Stocking, S.C., No. 08-cv-65-bbc, 2008 WL 3540405, at *6
(W.D. Wis. Aug. 13, 2008) (“I do not agree . . . that the absence of any profit motive on the
Association’s part means that it cannot be a ‘successor’ to a merchant under the Act.”).
124. Radtke v. Levin, No. 01-2616, 2002 WL 772750, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2002)
(holding that, in a dispute between two cohabitants over $1500 loaned for a down payment on
a truck, neither was a merchant, and the dispute was “akin to that encountered in divorce
proceedings”); Bruns v. Frederick, No. 91-2776, 1992 WL 211153, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. June 9,
1992) (barring an action for replevin under Section 425.205 of the Wisconsin Statutes where
the plaintiff conceded that she was not a creditor under that section or the WCA).
125. Greve v. Laufenberg, No. 93-1549, 1994 WL 513710, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 22,
1994) (finding that where the plaintiff charged interest on a debt only after several years in
order to motivate the debtor to pay, he was not a merchant where the parties “never agreed
to deferred or installment payments on credit”).
126. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10) (2009–2010).
127. See id. § 421.301(34), .301(42).
128. Id. § 421.301(34).
129. Hartman v. Meridian Fin. Servs., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1049 (W.D. Wis. 2002).
130. See WIS. STAT. § 421.301(42). The WCA reads as follows:
(a) “Services” includes:
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on the scope of the statutory definitions, courts have interpreted the
definition of services inclusively. The leading case defining the scope of
131
services covered by the WCA is Seeger v. AFNI, Inc.
As discussed
above, in Seeger, a number of individuals entered into cell phone
132
contracts with Cingular. When litigation ensued between the parties,
the customers claimed that AFNI—who had purchased the accounts
133
134
from Cingular —violated the WCA by charging a collection fee. In
their defense, AFNI asserted that cell phone contracts were not the type
of service covered by the WCA, and further, that the plaintiffs admitted
in their deposition that the cell phone contracts did not meet the
135
definition of “services” in the Act.
First, the court noted that the
plaintiffs’ beliefs regarding the definition of services were irrelevant
because the meaning of the definition “is an issue of law rather than a
136
question of fact.”
In particular, the court indicated that “judicial
admissions are only applicable to questions of fact, and not to questions
137
of law.” Second, the court noted that the type of services listed in the
services definition are very “general and broad” and are unrelated to
138
each other. For example, the court illustrated the diversity of services
by citing “education, recreation, [and] cemetery accommodations” as a
139
few of the listed services. In fact, the court candidly admitted that with
such a broad and diverse list of services, “it is not entirely clear” how to

1. Work, labor and other personal services;
2. Privileges with respect to transportation, hotel and restaurant
accommodations, education, entertainment, recreation, physical culture, hospital
accommodations, funerals, cemetery accommodations, and the like; and
3. Insurance provided in connection with a consumer credit transaction.
(b) “Services” does not include any services of common carriers if the tariffs, rates,
charges, costs or expenses of such common carriers are required by law to be filed
with or approved by the federal government or any official, department, division,
commission or agency of the United States.
Id. § 421.301(42).
131. Seeger v. AFNI, Inc., No. 05-C-714, 2007 WL 1598618 (E.D. Wis. June 1, 2007).
132. Id. at *2.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *5.
135. Id. at *8.
136. Id. at *9.
137. Id. (citing McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt. Corp., 298 F.3d 677, 682 (7th Circ. 2002)).
138. Id. at *10.
139. Id.
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distinguish those services that are included from those that are not.
The court further found the phrase “and the like” contained in the
service definition “not especially limiting . . . in light of the divergent
141
categories of services listed.” As a result, the court held that cellular
services are a type of service that would fit within the broad definition of
142
services contained in the WCA.
E. Credit
1. The Elements of Granting Credit
Credit is “the right granted by a creditor to a customer [1] to defer
payment of debt, [2] to incur debt and defer its payment or [3] to
143
purchase goods, services or interests in land on a time price basis.”
The term “time price basis” anticipates a process whereby a customer
pays its contractual obligation over a period of time resulting in a higher
144
overall price because finance charges are applied.
An agreement to
pay annual maintenance fees, however, is not a time price basis
145
contract.
If no credit is extended there can be no consumer credit transaction
146
or consumer approval transaction. One who buys delinquent accounts
147
Rather, the credit is
for collection is not one who supplies credit.
148
extended by other entities before the account became delinquent. A

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(14) (2009–2010).
144. Berndt v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1134 (W.D. Wis. 2004).
145. Id. (holding the WCA inapplicable to a transaction between a couple owning a
condominium timeshare and the condominium owner’s association because “time price basis”
is a “process in which a consumer pays portions of the total amount owed over a fixed period
of time and agrees to a higher overall price after finance charges are applied” and not after
“plaintiffs’ agreement to pay annual maintenance fees”).
146. See Bechstein v. Brandenburger & Davis, 474 F. Supp. 971, 973 (E.D. Wis. 1979)
(finding the transaction at issue was not a “consumer credit transaction” as defined in the
WCA because “[t]he plaintiff’s obligation to the defendant in this case involved neither the
payment of installments nor credit for which a finance charge might be imposed”).
147. See Rsidue, LLC v. Michaud, 2006 WI App 164, ¶ 13, 295 Wis. 2d 585, 721 N.W.2d
718 (holding that a corporation that purchased an overdue credit card account and attempted
to collect on the debt is not a creditor because the decision to extend credit was made by its
predecessors in interest).
148. Id.
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creditor’s withdrawal of funds from an individual’s account to cover a
149
nonsufficient funds (NSF) check is also not considered a credit
150
transaction.
The concept of “agreement” is critical when analyzing whether
credit has been granted in a particular transaction. Before the debt is
151
incurred, there must be an agreement to extend credit.
The WCA
defines agreement as “the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their
language or by implication from other circumstances including course of
152
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance.”
“Course of
dealing” is used to describe the practices under past contracts between
153
the parties; “course of performance” describes the practices under the
154
current contract between the parties; and “trade practice” is the
general practices in the particular industry that is the subject matter of
155
the transaction. In other words, in deciding whether the merchant has
granted credit to the customer, the courts analyze the contract between
the parties, their course of dealing, their course of performance and
trade practices, as well as any implications from other circumstances
156
relevant to the transaction.
A classic example of extending credit is
where the parties’ agreement includes the loan and financing terms of
157
the transaction—an agreement to incur debt and defer payment.
However, charging interest after a debt is due does not involve
158
extending credit.
2. Judicial Interpretation of Granting Credit
There are a number of principles that can be garnered from the
149. Endo Steel, Inc. v. Janas (In re JWJ Contracting Co.), 371 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.
2004) (noting that a NSF check is one that has been dishonored due to insufficient funds).
150. Co-op Credit Union v. Bement, No. 02-2403, 2003 WL 21027264, at *2 (Wis. Ct.
App. May 8, 2003).
151. See WIS. STAT. § 421.301(14) (2009–2010).
152. Id. § 421.301(3).
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223 (1981).
154. See id. § 202 cmt. g.
155. Id. § 222.
156. See, e.g., Seeger v. AFNI, Inc., No. 05-C-714, 2007 WL 1598618, at *5–16 (E.D.
Wis. June 1, 2007); Hartman v. Meridian Fin. Servs., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1048–49
(W.D. Wis. 2002).
157. See, e.g., Hartman, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1049.
158. Greve v. Laufenberg, No. 93-1549, 1994 WL 513710, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 22,
1994).
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various decisions by the courts. First, if the agreement between the
merchant and customer has a fixed term, the court will likely conclude
159
that the merchant granted credit. Second, in the absence of a fixedterm contract, the courts use a balancing test to determine if the
160
merchant granted credit. Third, in applying the balancing test, courts
consider “other circumstances” such as course of dealing, course of
161
performance, and trade practice. Fourth, courts do not consider credit
162
granted simply because a debt is “paid over time.”
And finally, a
merchant’s grant of a thirty-day grace period for payment does not
163
appear to be a grant of credit by the merchant.
First, several cases have focused on fixed-term contracts that permit
164
a customer to incur debt and pay it over time.
In Seeger v. AFNI,
165
Inc., the plaintiffs entered into cell phone contracts with Cingular for a
166
fixed term. When litigation ensued between the parties, the plaintiffs
asserted that the cell phone contracts involved the extension of credit
167
under the WCA. The plaintiffs argued that their cellular plan allowed
them to exceed “their monthly allotment of minutes and pay later,”
168
On the
which, they argued, is tantamount to an extension of credit.
169
other hand, AFNI—who had purchased the accounts from Cingular —
argued that the cell phone contracts should be considered either a
170
prepaid or pay-as-you-go service. The court noted that “purchasers of
cell phone services receive their services prior to paying for them, which
159. See Seeger, 2007 WL 1598618, at *12; Milwaukee Alarm Co. v. Chaney, No. 970866, 1998 WL 60976, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 1998).
160. See Degrave v. Door Cnty. Coop., No. 96-1606, 1996 WL 722828, at *2 (Wis. Ct.
App. Dec. 17, 1996).
161. See id.; see also WIS. STAT. § 421.301(3).
162. Dean Med. Ctr., S.C. v. Conners, 2000 WI App 202, ¶ 12, 238 Wis. 2d 636, 618
N.W.2d 194; Langheim v. Kasch, No. 93-1603-FT, 1993 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1339, at *7–8 (Oct.
21, 1993).
163. Alaskan Fireplace, Inc. v. Everett, No. 02-3016-FT, 2003 WL 21397747, at *1, *4
(Wis. Ct. App. June 18, 2003); Hooven v. Truck Country, No. 97-2215, 1998 Wisc. App.
LEXIS 655, at *5 (June 9, 1998).
164. See Seeger, 2007 WL 1598618, at *3, *14; Milwaukee Alarm Co., 1998 WL 60976, at
*1.
165. Seeger, 2007 WL 1598618.
166. Id. at *3.
167. Id. at *10.
168. Id.
169. Id. at *2.
170. Id. at *10.
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technically amounts to a deferment of payment.”
Further, the court
reasoned that when one signs a service contract, he or she has a
continuing obligation to pay money to that service provider and thereby
172
has incurred debt.
Furthermore, the court noted that the plaintiffs
were allowed to defer payment of their contractual debt by making
173
payment after they received the service.
Therefore, the court
concluded that the cell phone contracts satisfied the definition of credit
because the contracts “allowed the plaintiffs to incur debt and defer its
174
payment.”
Interestingly, during the litigation, Cingular obtained a
written opinion from the Secretary of the Department of Financial
Institutions stating that cell phone contracts are not an extension of
175
credit. Based on that opinion, Cingular asserted that the WCA’s safe
176
harbor provision —which protects companies from liability when they
177
rely upon a written opinion of the administrator—should apply. The
court concluded, however, that Cingular’s informal e-mail to the
administrator did not comply with the procedures necessary under the
safe harbor provision, that Cingular was attempting to obtain a ruling
from an entity other than the court, and that any such ruling would not
178
be binding on the court.
179
Similarly, in Milwaukee Alarm Co. v. Chaney, a customer signed a
five-year alarm service contract for $19 per month, billed quarterly, with
a termination fee if the customer canceled the contract before the end of
180
the five-year term.
During litigation between the parties, the issue
181
became whether the alarm service contract was an extension of credit.
Milwaukee Alarm argued that the service contract was a payment for a
services-as-rendered agreement, so the customer had no obligation to

171. Id. at *12.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. WIS. STAT. § 426.104(4)(a) (2009–2010).
177. Seeger, 2007 WL 1598618, at *13.
178. Id.
179. Milwaukee Alarm Co. v. Chaney, No. 97-0866, 1998 WL 60976 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb.
17, 1998).
180. Id. at *1.
181. Id.
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182

pay unless the customer received services. The court disagreed. The
court reasoned that the customer incurred debt the moment he signed
the contract and was permitted to defer its payment over the five-year
183
period. As a result, this transaction was found to be an extension of
184
credit.
Second, if the agreement between the parties does not have a fixed
term, the courts use an objective test when considering the other
circumstances relevant to the transaction, including course of dealing,
185
course of performance, and trade practice.
In DeGrave v. Door
186
County Cooperative, consumers—who were members of a co-op—
187
periodically made purchases for their farm from the co-op. Purchases
188
Each invoice sent to the consumers
were made on credit and cash.
provided that “all purchases [were] due within the following month,”
and “[a] finance charge of 1.5% per month . . . [would] be assessed” on
189
all outstanding balances. The issue before the court was whether the
purchases that were due within the following month were a credit
190
transaction.
Upon viewing the terms of the invoice, the court
concluded that the terms “implie[d] permission for [the co-op]
member[s] to pay in multiple payments, including payments after the
191
designated due date.” Despite the co-op’s insistence that “the invoices
unambiguously required payment by a certain date,” the court
concluded that “a reasonable person reading [the invoice] terms could
192
believe that the co-op permitted payments after the due date.”
The
court considered it significant that the consequence of making a
193
payment after the due date was the imposition of a finance charge.

182. Id. at *2.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Degrave v. Door Cnty. Coop., No. 96-1606, 1996 WL 722828, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App.
Dec. 17, 1996) (applying a reasonable person standard to determine whether the invoice
terms unambiguously required payment by a specific date); see also WIS. STAT. § 421.301(3).
186. Degrave, 1996 WL 722828, at *1.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at *2.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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Third, although not discussed in the DeGrave decision, it is likely
that the course of dealing between the co-op and the DeGraves (and the
other co-op members), as well as the general trade practice of co-ops,
were other circumstances relevant to the determination of whether
credit was granted. For instance, in Dean Medical Center, S.C. v.
194
Conners, where the Medical Center provided services to a patient, the
court considered other circumstances relevant to whether credit was
195
granted.
Upon nonpayment by the patient, the Medical Center
196
initiated a collection action. The issue before the court was whether
197
the transaction between the parties was a consumer credit transaction.
More specifically, the issue was whether the Medical Center had agreed
to extend credit to the patient by permitting the patient to pay for the
198
medical services through installment payments.
The Medical Center
argued that there were no circumstances that would suggest that credit
199
was being extended to the patient.
The patient argued that the
Medical Center’s “practice of regularly allowing customers to pay their
bills over time” indicated that credit was regularly extended by the
200
Center.
The court looked at a number of factors in reaching its
201
decision. First, there was no evidence that would indicate that there
202
was an agreement between the parties for the extension of credit.
203
Second, credit is not extended or created simply by not paying a debt.
Third, it was the Medical Center’s “customary business practice” not to
offer credit or to permit the patient to pay in installments at the time the

194. Dean Med. Ctr., S.C. v. Conners, 2000 WI App 202, 238 Wis. 2d 636, 618 N.W.2d
194.
195. Id. ¶ 2.
196. Id. ¶ 3.
197. Id. ¶ 5 (explaining that the issue of “[w]hether a particular transaction is a
consumer credit transaction subject to the WCA is a mixed question of fact and law”).
198. Id. ¶ 8.
199. Id. (explaining that the Medical Center argued that no facts showed that “payment
for the services could be made either in installments or be subject to the imposition of a
finance charge”).
200. Id.
201. Id. ¶ 12.
202. See id. (“[W]e would have to re-write the agreement under which services had
already been provided were we to allow those services to create a consumer debt simply by
virtue of nonpayment.”).
203. Id. ¶ 13.
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204

services were rendered. The court noted that the only time patients
were permitted to pay their bill over time was when the patient had
205
failed to pay the bill in full within thirty days after the services were
206
Based on the foregoing, the court concluded that
rendered.
“permitting a debtor to pay over time only after attempts at collecting
207
the bill . . . have failed” is not an extension of credit.
208
Similarly, in Langheim v. Kasch, a doctor provided medical
209
services to a patient on ten occasions.
In a subsequent collection
dispute between the parties, the sole issue before the court was whether
the contract between the doctor and patient was a consumer credit
210
transaction. The court concluded that the patient was unable to show
211
The evidence
that the doctor’s services were rendered on credit.
indicated that when services were first provided to the patient, the
doctor required the patient to fill out an information sheet, which would
212
include his insurance reimbursement number.
Unfortunately, the
patient provided an incorrect insurance reimbursement number, which
213
caused the debt to accrue.
The court reasoned that the inference
drawn from the doctor requesting the insurance reimbursement number
214
was that the doctor was not providing services on a credit basis.
Again, the course of dealing between the parties and the general trade
practice in the medical service industry likely had an impact on the
court’s decision.
Fourth, and finally, there are the curious cases where payment is due
within thirty days, and the courts find no extension of credit. In Alaskan
215
Fireplace, Inc. v. Everett, consumers contracted for the installation of

204. Id. ¶ 12.
205. See id. ¶ 11 (“When payment is not made on the date of service, patients are told
that Dean will send them a bill that is due in full within thirty days of receipt.”).
206. Id. ¶ 13.
207. Id.
208. Langheim v. Kasch, No. 93-1603-FT, 1993 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1339 (Oct. 21, 1993).
209. Id. at *6.
210. Id. at *1.
211. Id. at *6–7.
212. Id. at *2.
213. Id.
214. Id. at *7–8.
215. Alaskan Fireplace, Inc. v. Everett, No. 02-3016-FT, 2003 WL 21397747 (Wis. Ct.
App. June 18, 1998).
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216

two fireplaces. The customers “never discussed financing terms with
217
Alaskan Fireplace.” The contract signed by the parties provided that
payment was to be made “net 30 days [with a] 1.5% monthly service
218
In a subsequent dispute between the
charge for overdue invoices.”
parties, the court had to decide whether the transaction was a consumer
219
credit transaction.
The court held that the transaction was a cash
220
The court reasoned
transaction, not a consumer credit transaction.
221
that the contract terms did not anticipate the extension of credit. The
court interpreted the contract terms to mean that “Alaskan Fireplace
did not grant the [customer] permission to defer payment of their
222
debt.”
In sum, the court found “[t]here was never any intent by
223
Similarly, in Hooven v.
Alaskan Fireplace to extend any credit.”
224
Truck Country, a truck repair business failed to successfully repair a
225
customer’s truck, and the customer did not pay the bill. The invoice
sent by the truck repair business indicated that payment was due thirty
days after services were rendered, and in the event of failure to pay, an
226
18% finance charge would be assessed.
The court had to decide
whether the customer’s failure to pay the repair bill amounted to an
227
extension of credit. The court held that the truck repair business did
228
not extend credit to the customer.
The court reasoned that the
trucking company expected payment in full when it completed its
229
repairs.
Despite what the cases hold, under any reasonable interpretation of
the term credit, the merchant is granting credit—if only, for only a
thirty-day period. The statute does not specify any minimum time

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hooven v. Truck Country, No. 97-2215, 1998 Wisc. App. LEXIS 655 (June 9, 1998).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
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230

period for the extension of credit, and the creditor has given the
customer the right to defer payment for thirty days. On the other hand,
although unstated, it is possible that the courts recognize a general
industry practice to treat a thirty-day payment the same as a cash
payment. However, that is not in accord with at least one court’s
decision, which held that a cash transaction occurs when the customer
231
pays before the services are rendered.
F. Payable in Installments or Finance Charge Imposed
In order to qualify as a consumer credit transaction, the customer’s
obligation must be either payable in “installments” or provide that “a
232
finance charge is or may be imposed.”
This Part analyzes both
elements.
1. Payable in Installments
Payable in installments is a precisely defined term:
[M]ean[ing] that payment is required or permitted by agreement
to be made in [one of three ways]:
(a) Two or more installments, excluding the down payment in
a consumer credit sale, with respect to an obligation arising from
a consumer credit transaction for which a finance charge is or
may be imposed;
(b) More than 4 installments, excluding the down payment in a
consumer credit sale, in any other consumer credit transaction;
or
(c) Two or more installments if any installment other than the
down payment is more than twice the amount of any other
233
installment, excluding the down payment.
The definition of payable in installments provides that installments are

230. See WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10) (2009–2010) (defining “consumer credit transaction”);
id. § 421.301(14) (defining “credit”).
231. See Berndt v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1134 (W.D. Wis. 2004)
(holding that a bill sent to condo timeshare owners by a condo owners association amounted
to a cash transaction because the owners were to pay their bill before the services were
rendered).
232. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10).
233. Id. § 421.301(30).
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234

“required or permitted by agreement.” The WCA defines agreement
as “the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by
implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or
235
usage of trade or course of performance.”
Other circumstances
relevant to the transaction include (1) whether the amount payable
under the parties’ agreement was subject to any variable, such as usage,
and (2) whether the merchant took any action to indicate that the
236
account was overdue. Course of dealing means the parties’ practices
237
Course of performance means the parties’
under past contracts.
238
Trade practice
practices under the current contract between them.
means the general practices in the particular industry that is the subject
239
matter of the transaction. In sum, in deciding whether the agreement
permits the customer to pay in installments, courts analyze the contract
between the parties, their prior course of dealing, their current course of
performance, and trade practices—as well as any implications from
240
other circumstances relevant to the transaction. The courts appear to
be using an objective test when considering the various circumstances.
An example of the application of the objective test is DeGrave v.
241
Door County Cooperative.
As previously discussed, in DeGrave,
242
The cocustomers purchased farm supplies on credit from a co-op.
op’s invoice, which was sent to the customers each month, provided that
“all purchases [were] due within the following month. A finance charge
of 1.5% per month, or 18% per year [would] be assessed on the previous
243
balance less credits and payments.” In a subsequent dispute between
the parties, the customers argued that their obligation to the co-op was

234. Id.
235. Id. § 421.301(3).
236. See, e.g., Seeger v. AFNI, Inc., No. 05-C-714, 2007 WL 1598618, at *12 (E.D. Wis.
June 1, 2007); Dean Med. Ctr., S.C. v. Conners, 2000 WI App 202, ¶ 12, 238 Wis. 2d 636, 618
N.W.2d 194; Degrave v. Door Cnty. Coop., No. 96-1606, 1996 WL 722828, at *2 (Wis. Ct.
App. Dec. 17, 1996).
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223 (1981).
238. Id. § 202 cmt. g.
239. Id. § 222.
240. See Seeger, 2007 WL 1598618; Dean Med. Ctr., 2000 WI App 202, 238 Wis. 2d 636,
618 N.W.2d 194; Degrave, 1996 WL 722828.
241. Degrave, 1996 WL 722828.
242. Id. at *1.
243. Id.
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244

payable in installments. On the other hand, the co-op argued that the
invoices clearly required the customers to pay “by a certain date and
that therefore the [customers] were not granted the privilege of paying
245
in installments.”
The court held that the terms of the contract
“implie[d] permission for a [co-op] member to pay in multiple
246
payments, including payments after the designated due date.”
The
court noted that “[t]he only consequence of making [a] payment[] after
247
the due date [was] the addition of a finance charge.”
The court
indicated that a reasonable person reading the invoice terms “could
248
believe the co-op permitted payments after the due date.”
Interestingly, the invoice terms provided no set number of installment
payments, yet the court found the incurred debt to be payable in
249
installments.
Another important factor regarding payable by installments was
250
considered by the court in Dean Medical Center, S.C. v. Conners. As
discussed earlier, in Dean, a medical center provided services to a
251
patient.
Upon nonpayment by the patient, the Medical Center
252
The court
initiated a collection action against the former patient.
determined that there was not a consumer credit transaction. Important
in the court’s holding, was the determination that the contract between
the Medical Center and the patient did not allow for payment by
installments, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was allowed to
253
pay after payment was due. The court noted that to establish that a
debt was payable by installment the patients must be given “the option
254
of paying in installments at the time the services are provided.”
In
Dean, there was no indication that the patient was aware of the Medical
Center’s policies that allowed for credit payments after payment was

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at *1.
Dean Med. Ctr., S.C. v. Conners, 2000 WI App 202, 238 Wis. 2d 636, 618 N.W.2d

251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 12.

194.
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255

due.
The court, closely scrutinized the Medical Center’s method of
collection:
The bill requests payment in full within thirty days. If no
payment is received, a second bill is sent showing a past due
balance. If Dean receives no response to that bill, a third
statement is sent, and a phone call is made to try and collect the
debt. If the debt still is not paid, a fourth bill is sent with a notice
that the debt is being referred to a collection agency.
. . . [I]f a patient responds to any of the billing statements by
claiming an inability to pay in full, Dean will permit the debt to
be paid over time. [F]inance charges are never imposed on any
[of these] payments made over time.
. . . [A]t the time services are provided, patients are not
informed that they can pay the bill in installments, nor are they
informed about payment plans. When payment is not made on
the date of service, patients are told that Dean will send them a
256
bill that is due in full within thirty days of receipt.
Thus, as the court held, at the time the Medical Center rendered the
services, it neither offered credit nor allowed the patient to pay in
257
installments.
Based on the foregoing, the court concluded,
“permitting a debtor to pay over time only after attempts at collecting
the bill have failed does not . . . [create] a consumer credit
258
transaction.”
Another critical factor in determining whether a series of payments
is payable in installments is whether the amount payable under the
259
parties’ agreement is subject to any variable, such as usage. In Seeger
260
v. AFNI, Inc., as previously discussed, the plaintiffs entered into cell
261
phone agreements with Cingular. In a subsequent dispute between the
parties, the issue before the court was whether entering into the cell

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
2007).
260.
261.

Id. ¶ 10–12.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
See Seeger v. AFNI, Inc., No. 05-C-714, 2007 WL 1598618, at *14 (E.D. Wis. June 1,
Id. at *1.
Id.
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phone agreement was a consumer credit transaction.
More
specifically, the issue was whether a cell phone contract was the type of
263
obligation that was payable in installments. A typical cellular contract
provides a minimum fee each month for a certain amount of cellular
minutes but also allows the customer to pay extra for minutes used
264
beyond their allotted amount.
Each month the invoice requires
payment for the cell-phone services specifically provided in the prior
265
month. The court concluded that even though the cell phone contract
266
is a form of credit, it is not credit that is payable in installments. The
court reasoned that the contract does not permit the customer to pay
bills in installments, but rather the customer is obligated to pay the
267
entire bill for the prior month’s use.
In its analysis, the court
268
The
compared a cell phone contract with an alarm service contract.
court noted that an alarm service contract is for a fixed-year service
269
length and is billed at a specified cost per month. The total cost of the
service is determined by multiplying the monthly cost by the total
270
number of months in the contract. The monthly cost is not dependent
271
Most importantly, the
on the customer’s use of the alarm service.
customer is not being charged monthly or quarterly “for services
specifically provided for that [period],” but rather is paying off the total
272
contract price in installments over a predetermined period.
The
critical factor appears to be that the alarm service contract has no
variable, whereas the cellular contract is subject to the customer’s usage.
2. Finance Charge Imposed
In order to qualify as a consumer credit transaction, a customer’s
obligation must be either “payable in installments or for which . . . a

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *14.
Id. at *15.
Id.
Id. at *16.
Id. at *15.
Id. at *14–15.
Id. at *15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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273

finance charge is or may be imposed.” This section analyzes what
constitutes a finance charge. A finance charge is
[T]he sum of all charges, payable directly or indirectly by the
customer as an incident to or as a condition of the extension of
credit . . . . The term does not include any charge with respect to
a motor vehicle consumer lease. The term includes the following
types of charges to the extent they are not permitted additional
charges[,] . . . delinquency charges . . . or deferral charges . . . :
(a) Interest, time price differential and any amount payable
under a discount or other system of additional charges;
(b) Service, transaction, activity or carrying charge;
(c) Loan fee, points, finder’s fee or similar charge;
(d) Fee for an appraisal, investigation or credit report;
(e) Any charge imposed by a creditor upon another creditor
for purchasing or accepting an obligation of a customer if the
customer is required to pay any part of that charge . . . ;
(f) Premium or other charge for guarantee or insurance
protecting the creditor against the customer’s default or other
credit loss;
(g) Charges or premiums for credit life, accident or health
insurance, written in connection with any consumer credit
transaction to the extent they are not permitted as additional
charges . . . ;
(h) Charges or premiums for insurance written in connection
with any action against loss of or damage to property or against
liability arising out of the ownership or use of property to the
extent they are not permitted as additional charges . . . ; and
274
(i) Refund anticipation loans fees.
275

For example, in Patzka v. Viterbo College, a student enrolled in a
276
college. The school provided the student with a student loan, but at
the time of her enrollment, the school did not provide her with a student

273. WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10) (2009–2010).
274. Id. § 421.301(20); see also id. § 422.202 (defining additional charges); id. § 422.203
(defining delinquency charges); id. § 422.204 (defining deferral charges).
275. Patzka v. Viterbo Coll., 917 F. Supp. 654 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
276. Id. at 657.
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handbook that contained the financing terms for the loan. The loan
did provide for interest on the outstanding balance and a collection
278
fee. In subsequent litigation between the parties, the court indicated
that the interest charges are specifically part of the finance charge and
279
should have been disclosed to the student at the time of contracting.
Furthermore, in Palacios v. ABC TV & Stereo Rental of Milwaukee,
280
Inc., a customer entered into a contract for the use and possession of a
color television that the customer had the option to purchase by making
281
seventy-eight consecutive weekly payments of $23 per week. After a
period of time, the customer stopped making payments and brought an
282
action against the merchant. One issue before the court was whether
283
The court noted that a
the transaction included a finance charge.
284
finance charge includes any “time price differential.” The court found
that “a time-price differential was built into the agreement” between the
285
parties. The court reasoned that “[t]he time-price differential was the
difference between the fair market value of the television-stereo” and
the price the customer would eventually pay by making the seventy286
eight payments of $23 per week. Therefore, the agreement between
the parties did provide for a finance charge.
There are three types of charges that are not considered finance
287
288
289
charges.
Those are additional charges, delinquency charges, and
290
deferral charges.
For disclosure purposes, it is critical to be able to

277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 662.
280. Palacios v. ABC TV & Stereo Rental of Milwaukee, Inc., 123 Wis. 2d 79, 365
N.W.2d 882 (Ct. App. 1985).
281. Id. at 81, 365 N.W.2d at 884.
282. Id.
283. See id. at 87–88, 365 N.W.2d at 886–87 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 421.301(10)) (noting
that under the WCA, “[a] consumer credit transaction also exists where property is acquired
on credit, ‘for which credit a finance charge is or may be imposed’”).
284. Id. at 88, 365 N.W.2d at 887 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 421.301(20)(a)).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See WIS. STAT. § 421.301(20) (2009–2010).
288. See id. § 422.202 (defining additional charges).
289. See id. § 422.203 (defining delinquency charges).
290. See id. § 422.204 (defining deferral charges).
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distinguish a finance charge from these other charges.
The critical distinction between a finance charge and an additional
292
charge is whether the customer has the right to decline the charge. If
the customer has the right to decline the charge, then it is considered an
293
additional charge. On the other hand, if the charge is required as part
of the contract, the charge is a finance charge notwithstanding it may
294
295
have a different name. In Burney v. Thorn Americas, Inc., Rent-A296
Center became involved in litigation with a number of its customers.
One of the issues before the court was whether Rent-A-Center’s
contracts fairly disclosed the finance charge imposed in the
297
transaction.
Rent-A-Center argued that certain charges, such as
delivery, maintenance, and termination charges, should not be
298
considered part of the finance charge.
The court noted that the
purpose of the broad definition of finance charge contained in the WCA
299
A merchant should not be permitted to
is to protect the consumer.
hide the true cost of the financing by designating a charge to be
300
something other than a finance charge.
The court started with the
proposition that “any charge not part of the amount financed . . . is part
of the finance charge” unless it qualifies as an additional, delinquency,
301
or deferral charge.
The court offered a rule to follow when
distinguishing a finance charge from an additional charge. The rule is
that a customer must have the right to refuse the charge or service;
302
otherwise the charge is a finance charge. If a customer is purchasing
an item over time and has no choice but to take the additional charge or

291. See id. § 422.301–.310.
292. See Burney v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 762, 775 (E.D. Wis. 1996). See
generally WIS. STAT. § 422.202.
293. Burney, 944 F. Supp. at 775.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 762.
296. Id. at 764.
297. Id. (“The plaintiffs have moved for partial summary judgment on the following
issues: . . . whether Rent-A-Center has violated § 422.301 by failing to disclose the finance
charge as an interest rate.”).
298. Id. at 774.
299. See id. (“Easily understandable and accessible information is the best protection for
consumers.”).
300. Id.
301. Id. at 774–75.
302. Id. at 775.
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303

service, the charge is part of the finance charge. The court concluded
that for the delivery and maintenance charges that were associated with
the goods under contract, Rent-A-Center offered no evidence that the
304
rental customer could decline either charge.
Therefore, the charges
305
were considered part of the finance charge. Similarly, the termination
fee was a required part of the rent-to-own contract, and the customer
306
had no option to decline that fee. As a result, the termination fee was
307
also considered part of the finance charge.
One must also be able to distinguish a finance charge from a
delinquency or default charge (a late payment fee):
A delinquency or default charge is not a finance charge . . . if
imposed for actual unanticipated late payment, delinquency,
default or other such occurrence. However, when a merchant’s
billings are not paid in full within a stipulated time period and . . .
the merchant does not . . . regard such accounts [to be] in default
. . . and imposes charges periodically for delaying payment of
such accounts . . . until paid, the charge so imposed comes within
308
the definition of a finance charge.
Also, an account is not considered to be in default if the merchant
“customarily fail[s] to institute collection activity or . . . continu[es] to
309
extend credit” to the customer. The test utilized by the court appears
to be whether a reasonable person would conclude the parties’
agreement anticipated payment in full by a certain date, or whether the
customer could pay over time with the imposition of a finance charge.
A finance charge offers the debtor the option to pay or to “defer
310
payment with interest” being charged if the customer defers payment.
311
As previously discussed, in DeGrave v. Door County Cooperative,

303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. WIS. ADMIN. CODE DFI-WCA § 1.07 (2007).
309. Id.
310. Hooven v. Truck Country, No. 97-2215, 1998 Wisc. App. LEXIS 655, at *5 (June 9,
1998).
311. DeGrave v. Door Cnty. Coop., No. 96-1606, 1996 WL 722828 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec.
17, 1996).
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members of a co-op were permitted to buy items for use on their farm.
313
Some purchases were made in cash and others on credit. The contract
with the co-op provided that “all purchases [were] due within the
following month and a finance charge of 1.5% per month . . . [would] be
314
assessed to the previous balance less credits and payments.” The coop argued that the contract terms specifically required payment by a
certain date, and that the customers were not granted the right to pay
315
after the due date.
The court disagreed and concluded that “a
reasonable person reading [the invoice] terms could believe that the co316
op permitted payments after the due date.”
A late payment fee, on the other hand, bars deferral by the customer
317
and assesses interest for nonpayment by the due date.
As discussed
318
above, in Hooven v. Truck Country, a truck repair business entered
319
The
into a contract with a customer to repair the customer’s truck.
truck company’s invoice provided that payment was due thirty days
after the services were rendered, and overdue accounts would be
320
assessed an 18% finance charge. When litigation ensued between the
parties, the court had to determine whether the 18% charge was a
321
finance charge or a late payment fee.
Despite the fact that it was
stated to be a finance charge in the invoice, the court construed the fee
322
to be a late payment fee. The court noted that finance charges offer
the debtor the option to pay or to “defer payment with interest” being
323
charged if the customer defers payment.
On the other hand, a late
payment fee bars deferral by the customer and assesses interest for
324
nonpayment by the due date.
The evidence indicated that the truck
312. Id. at *1.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at *2.
316. Id.
317. Hooven v. Truck Country, No. 97-2215, 1998 Wisc. App. LEXIS 655, at *5 (June 9,
1998).
318. Id.
319. Id. at *1.
320. Id. at *4.
321. Id. at *1–2 (explaining that one claim brought by Hooven was a violation of the
WCA for “credit finance charges”).
322. Id. at *6.
323. Id. at *5.
324. Id. at *5–6.
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repair business “demanded payment in full and charged 18% interest on
325
default after a thirty-day grace period.”
Similarly, in Alaskan
326
Fireplace, Inc. v. Everett, Alaskan Fireplace entered into a contract
327
The proposal
with a customer for the installation of two fireplaces.
signed by the parties provided that payment was to be made “net 30
328
days [with a] 1.5% monthly service charge for overdue invoices.” In a
subsequent dispute between the parties, one issue before the court was
329
whether the monthly service charge was a finance charge. The court
concluded that the 1.5% monthly service charge was not a finance
330
The court construed the
charge but rather a late payment charge.
contract between the parties to mean that payment was to be made
“within thirty days of the installation of the fireplaces with the 1.5%
331
monthly charge intended to dissuade late payment.”
Further, the
court took note of the fact that the merchant considered the customer’s
account to be in default upon failure to make the payment after the
332
thirty days.
III. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to determine whether a particular consumer transaction
is one that is subject to the requirements of the WCA. The transaction
must be a consumer credit transaction. A consumer credit transaction
has six independent elements and each one must be satisfied. Each
element has its own unique litigation points. The first element is a
consumer transaction, which requires a customer and an agreement
between them. The second element is the customer, which requires the
consumer to establish the transaction was for personal, family, or
household purposes. This issue essentially becomes whether the
transaction was a personal or business transaction. The courts are split

325. Id. at *6.
326. Alaskan Fireplace, Inc. v. Everett, No. 02-3016-FT, 2003 WL 21397747 (Wis. Ct.
App. June 18, 2003).
327. Id. at *1.
328. Id.
329. Id. (“The Everetts counterclaimed alleging that Alaskan Fireplace violated the
WCA . . . by ‘falsely advertising (through omission) that the agreement for purchase of the
fireplace and installation services would subject defendants to a finance charge.’”).
330. Id. at *4.
331. Id. at *1.
332. Id. at *5.
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on how to make that determination. The third element is the merchant,
which is much different than the merchant definition under the UCC.
The fourth element is that the subject matter of the contract must be
real or personal property, services, or money. Unfortunately, the courts
have not adopted a useful rule for distinguishing the type of services
subject to the WCA. The fifth element requires an extension of credit
by the merchant. There are a number of useful principles that can be
extracted from the cases when analyzing this element, including the fact
that the courts use an objective test in making a final decision. Finally,
the last element requires proof that the customer’s obligation is either
payable in installments or subject to a finance charge. The courts
analyze a number of factors in deciding whether the merchant granted
the customer the right to pay in installments. The finance charge
element requires a determination of whether the charge is a finance
charge, a late–payment fee, or an additional charge. Each charge has
unique characteristics that distinguish it from the others.

